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Abstract
This paper estimates the monetary returns to different university
majors and the risks related to them. The residuals from a Mincer-
type income regression are decomposed into unobserved heterogeneity
(known to the individual when making her education choice) and risk
(unknown to the individual). The risk estimates are corrected for se-
lection by applying the selection correction model of Lee (1983) and
an instrument based on the local supply of education in different ma-
jors. The differences in risks between different majors are found to be
mostly statistically insignificant but differences in returns to majors
are larger and significant. Both, income uncertainty and mean returns
are found to be larger for men than for women.
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1 Introduction
Human capital assets are perhaps the most important form of investments
made by individuals. In a standard human capital accumulation framework,
individuals invest time (and possible tuition fees) in their education and the
potential return to education materializes as higher future earnings.
Since the returns to human capital are uncertain and they are realized
only several years after the choice of education is made, there is an inherent
uncertainty in human capital investments. This paper studies the risk-return
association of a particular type of human capital assets, namely university
level degrees from different majors.
There are considerable differences in earnings of people who have grad-
uated from different majors. For instance, the raw mean earnings of people
who major in medicine are roughly 60% higher than those of arts majors.
In addition, there are differences in unemployment risks and earnings vari-
ances across fields. However, it is not clear, if the differences are due to the
fact that different people choose to major in different fields or differences in
majors as such.1
This paper answers two interrelated questions. First, I study how much
different university majors differ in their return. In addition, I study if there
are differences in the earnings uncertainty related to these majors.
Comparing monetary returns of major subjects is complicated by the
fact that people self-select into their major subjects. Therefore, it remains
unclear whether the earnings differences between particular fields are due to
different types of education or due to differences in observable (e.g. school
grades and family background) or unobservable characteristics (e.g. abilities,
motivation, taste for risk) between individuals who choose different majors.
This unobserved heterogeneity may bias estimates for mean returns to major
subjects upwards or downwards.2 The unobserved heterogeneity also com-
1A pioneer in the literature studying the risk-return nexus of human capital invest-
ments is Palacios-Huerta (2003) who studies the risk-return trade-off in education levels
and compares them to financial investments. Christiansen et al. (2007) take a similar
approach, but they study majors in addition to levels. Relatedly, Hartog & Vijverberg
(2007) and Diaz-Serrano et al. (2008) study the association of mean income and higher
moments of the income distribution between education groups. None of these papers
explicitly model selection into education.
2Willis & Rosen (1979) formulate a structural model for selection into education and
2
plicates the estimation of variances. This is because the realized dispersion
in observed earnings is a result of two distinct components: an unexpected
permanent income shock and unobserved heterogeneity across workers.3
Self-selected education causes the returns to a major to differ from the
return we would expect to observe if the education was randomly allocated.
To understand the effect of self-selection into a major subject, I correct for
selection when estimating income premia and uncertainty related to major
choice using the multinomial selectivity correction of Lee (1983) and a para-
metric assumption on the distribution of unobservables. I model each major
as a distinct ”market” which gives rise to a distinct earnings process.
The measure of uncertainty in this paper is the ex ante variance of earn-
ings. It is the variance of earnings that is not captured by observable charac-
teristics or unobserved heterogeneity, which is inferred from agents’ choices.
I decompose the ex ante variance into two components: a permanent compo-
nent and a transitory component which reflects idiosyncratic shocks to their
income streams.4 The transitory component is allowed to vary with time
and with education. Ths unobserved heterogeneity is identified from the ac-
tual education choices made by the agent. This paper studies an unordered
multinomial education choice (choice of major) rather than an ordered one
study how the selection biases the estimated returns to college education. Card (2001)
surveys problems that arise due to unobservable characteristics, which affect both selection
into education and the returns to it, and discusses solutions to these problems.
3Cunha et al. (2005) and Chen (2008) model the selection into education and decom-
pose permanent income differences within an education level into unobserved heterogeneity
and uncertainty using U.S. data on levels of education. The main focus of Cunha et al.
(2005) is the distribution of returns of a college education, whereas Chen (2008) studies
the potential variances of different levels of education corrected for selectivity effects and
makes a distinction between permanent income variance and transitory income shocks.
Charles & Luoh (2003), Beffy et al. (2012), Arcidiacono et al. (2012), Mazza (2012)
and Montmarquette et al. (2002) study the flip side of the same issue. They study how
expected earnings and their dispersion affect schooling choices. The riskiness of majors is
either estimated from a structural model, a survey, or a combination of the two.
4The measure of earnings risk is rather standard in the literature, but it disregards the
higher moments of the income distribution. In particular, it has been shown that gamblers
may be risk-averse but skew-loving at the same time (e.g. Golec & Tamarkin 1998).
Further Hartog & Vijverberg (2007) show that high variance is positively correlated with
income and higher skew is negatively correlated with income when comparing different
majors in their data. These are consistent with the fact that workers dislike risk but are
attracted to positive skew when choosing their occupation.
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(high school versus college).5
The model presented in this paper is estimated using Finnish registry
data. An attractive feature of the Finnish tax code for the current purposes
is that virtually all of the income transfers, including unemployment benefits
are taxable and are therefore observed in the tax registry. Therefore, the
biases inherent in survey based approaches are not an issue in the current
paper.
The results of this paper also have policy relevance. The perceived risk-
iness of some human capital investments is a subject of an on-going debate
on the financing of higher education. For example, a claim persists that
certain fields of education have such an inherent risk involved that without
large subsidies for schooling, no one would choose those majors. By deriving
major subject specific income uncertainty measures corrected for selection,
this paper provides a test for differences in riskiness of different majors.
Estimating a selection model necessitates an instrument, which affects
only the probability of graduating with a degree from a given major, but does
not affect potential post-graduation earnings. To construct the instrument,
I take advantage of an institutional feature in Finnish tertiary education.
Namely, in Finland students apply directly to a university-major combina-
tion. Universities have strict quotas for how many students they accept each
year for each major. These quotas define how competitive the admission to
each university-major combination is and, consequently, how difficult it is
to be admitted to study a given subject in a given university. For example,
since the ratio of applicants to starting places is higher in medicine in Oulu
compared to medicine in Helsinki, an upper secondary school graduate in
Oulu is more likely to be admitted to study and to eventually graduate from
medicine compared to an upper secondary school graduate from Helsinki.
Even though upper secondary school graduates from Helsinki may apply to
Oulu and vice versa, this mobility incurs both monetary and psychic moving
costs, which make people reluctant to move. The exclusion restriction builds
on the assumption that, for a marginal student, these moving costs matter
so much that they affect their tertiary education choices.
5In a recent working paper, Reyes et al. (2013) present a model of (an unordered)
university choice which features observed and unobserved heterogeneity and their effect
on early career wages using Chilean data. Also Napari (2008) estimates field specific
returns to higher education using Finnish data but does not model selection into majors.
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The vast majority of papers studying monetary return to education use
either hourly wages of workers or mean incomes over a long period of time as
a dependent variable. This approach disregards one of the most important
source of earnings uncertainty; namely, the risk of unemployment. Instead of
hourly wages, this paper studies yearly total taxable income, which, in addi-
tion to income from employment, includes unemployment benefits and other
taxable transfers. This measure gives a more complete picture of the income
uncertainty related to a level of education. Using total taxable income as
the measure of income also mitigates the problem of endogenous selection
into employment, as people are observed even if they are not working.
I estimate separate models for men and women. In most of the compara-
ble studies attention is limited to men, because female workforce participa-
tion in most countries has been much lower until recent years. Nonetheless,
female workforce participation in Finland has been very high as early as the
1990s, which warrants doing a similar analysis also for females. Further-
more, since both female education and female workforce participation has
also increased internationally, I find that calculating comparable measures
for males and females is also interesting in its own right from an international
perspective. In addition, I am able to test whether there are differences in
the uncertainty of career paths between men and women.
As a preview of the results, I find that the differences in the returns to
majors are found to be far greater than the differences in risks associated
with them. Further, the proportion of unobserved heterogeneity is found to
be statistically indistingquishable from zero for most majors. This, in turn,
suggests that the differences in returns to majors outweigh the differences in
risks associated with them.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses data; sample
construction, descriptive statistics, grouping of major subjects, the definition
of concept and the instrumental variables. Section 4.3 describes the empir-
ical model. Section 4.4 discusses the first and second stage estimates. The
uncertainty estimates are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the
paper.
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2 Data
2.1 Sample construction and observables
The data used in this paper is based on longitudinal census data collected by
Statistics Finland. It contains rich information on individuals’ educational
attainment, income, mother tongue, and region of residence and on their
parental socioeconomic status (based on the occupation of both parents)
and education (highest level of education of both parents); it spans the years
1990-2006. Table 1 gives the descriptive statistics for the main explanatory
variables.
In addition to demographic and income information, the data has been
linked to matriculation examination grades for years 1990-1995. Finnish up-
per secondary school graduates all take part in a standardized examination,
which gives students a general qualification to apply for universities and
vocational colleges. The examination is centrally administered and graded
according to uniform criteria across the country and the results are scaled
so that they are comparable across years.
There are four compulsory exams in the matriculation examination: mother
tongue, the second official language, one foreign language and either mathe-
matics or a science and arts exam. In addition, students may take exams in
other foreign languages and take both the mathematics and the science and
arts option. Finally, there are two alternatives versions of the mathematics
exam; a basic level exam and an advanced level exam. Generally, to be ac-
cepted to study a mathematically oriented major in the university, students
have to have taken the advanced level exam in mathematics.
The data used in this paper includes four measures related to the matric-
ulation examination. I observe the average grade of all tests taken (general
grade). In addition, I observe grades in mother tongue and in mathematics.
Finally, there is an indicator for whether a student has taken the basic level
or the advanced level exam in mathematics. The exams are graded on a
scale of 0-5, where 0 indicates a failed exam.6
I consider the matriculation examination grades as a rather good measure
for general academic ability for two reasons. First, it is a standardized
test which has a central role in the university admissions, so matriculation
6The grades are given on an ordinal scale as Latin words from improbatur (fail; 0) to
laudatur (excellent; 5).
6
exam is a high-stakes exam. In addition, it is taken by all upper secondary
school graduates regardless of whether they are planning to apply to tertiary
education or not, so the grading does not suffer from selection bias. The
proportions of different degrees vary between males and females in the data.
For instance, technology is clearly a male-dominated field and arts a female-
dominated field.
Three notes can be already made from the descriptive data. First, the
university graduates earn more than the non-graduates. Further, they have
less work experience, and are more academically able as evidenced by their
matriculation examination grades.
2.2 Classification of majors
To make sure that each major cell has enough observations. I have pooled
the education majors into five fairly homogenous categories. These are:
• S = 0; Upper secondary level education,
• S = 1; Arts, education and social sciences,
• S = 2; Law,
• S = 3; Business,
• S = 4; Engineering and natural sciences, and
• S = 5; Medicine and pharmacy.
Pooling the majors in the aforementioned fashion reduces the number of
parameters to be estimated, and therefore reduces the complexity of the
model considerably.7 The pooling of categories is, to some extent, arbitrary.
Nonetheless, categories are homogenous with respect to their matriculation
examination grades and mean incomes after graduation.8 Nonetheless, if
7I have excluded fine arts graduates from the model because of the very small sample
size in those subjects.
8Each major category consists of several major subjects. I tested if the major subject
specific means of income and matriculation examination grade variables differed from one
another within each grouped major category. The null hypothesis of same means was not
rejected for any of these variables within a major at 5 % risk level.
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there is heterogeneity within the categories, this will interfere with the un-
certainty estimates. The schooling S = 0 is used as a reference group to
which all other higher education majors are compared to.
I also do a second simplification. Namely, I restrict the return to a
major to be the same across different universities. I do this because the data
does not have information on the actual institution from which people have
graduated but only their place of residence at the time of graduation. To
control for regional earnings differences, I include dummies for the region of
residence at the time of graduation in the earnings regression.
I classify people according to their tertiary degrees and exclude decisions
related to post-tertiary education (for example, an engineer who has later
completed a doctoral degree in the arts is classified as an engineer). Further-
more, I limit my attention to people who have either completed a university
level master or a bachelor level degree or, alternatively, have not finished any
post-secondary degree, who are used as comparison group. Because I only
have information on completed degrees, I classify university drop-outs as up-
per secondary school graduates. Finally, I exclude people with a vocational
tertiary education. This exclusion is done because the selection into voca-
tional tertiary education is less standardized and consequently more difficult
to measure.
2.3 Measure of income
I observe the individuals for the time period between the years 1990 and 2006.
I limit my attention to people who had completed their secondary level ed-
ucation between 1990 and 1995. For the people who have a post-secondary
degree, I include only the earnings observations past their graduation. Fur-
ther, I exclude observations where people are classified as students, retired
or outside of the workforce.
The outcome variable in income regressions is the log of total yearly tax-
able income which, in addition to wages, includes taxable income transfers.
As a result, the observed income streams allow for spells of unemployment.
This reflects the fact that the risk of unemployment constitutes a consider-
able part of total income uncertainty. However, if a person drops out of the
workforce entirely, she only contributes to the estimation for the years for
which she is part of the workforce. This income concept may introduce a
8
problem of its own, since unemployment may be voluntary or involuntary. To
separate these from one another, solely individual-year observations where
the main type of activity of an individual is either working or unemployed
are included in the estimation9. The approach chosen leaves some observa-
tions with zero income. I exclude these observations. This does not affect
the main results, because the share of zero-observations is very small (less
than 1% of yearly observations)10. To ensure comparability between years,
the measure of income is deflated to EUR 2006 using the Consumer Price
Index.
It should already be noted that the people in the sample are, on average,
rather young and at the beginning of their careers. Therefore, the earnings
of individuals are observed from the beginning of their career. This may
drive some of the results, but I still perceive the findings as indicative of the
earnings uncertainty faced by recent university graduates.
9In general, for an individual to be classified as unemployed (and be eligible for unem-
ployment benefits), she must agree to accept a job if offered one.
10None of the results qualitatively change whether I exclude them or replace the zero
observations with a small positive income value.
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2.4 Exclusion restriction
To ensure that the joint identification of schooling choice and earnings equa-
tions is not solely based on functional form assumptions, I utilize an instru-
ment, which is assumed to monotonously affect the probability of choosing
a particular major subject, but not to affect the earnings after graduation.
Since post-secondary education is state sponsored in Finland, there are
no cost side instruments available. Instead, I use a proxy measure for local
supply of education as an instrument. Local supply of education is measured
by the ratio of annual number of starting places to applicants at region level
for each major11. There are some regions with more than one study program
offering the same major (e.g., Finnish and Swedish language universities in
Varsinais-Suomi and Uusimaa). For these regions, an average of applicants-
to-places ratio weighted by the number of starting places is calculated. For
the regions that do not have a university or a program in a particular major,
an average of applicants-to-places ratio weighted by the distance to each
university region where one can study each major is calculated. The supply
is measured at the year of matriculation at region level.12
The admission to university is based on a combination of the matricula-
tion examination grades and the university entrance exams. It is merit-based
and objective. In particular, there is no minority support or weight for extra-
curricular activities. Different majors and universities give different relative
weights to different subjects in the matriculation exam. Generally, the more
competitive a major is, the more weight is given to the entrance examination
relative to the matriculation examination.
The supply of education may be correlated with the outcome through
some other channels beside its effect on choice of majors, which would
threaten the validity of the instrument. As discussed by Card (1993), this
may happen because families living in university regions have different edu-
cational or social backgrounds than families living in non-university regions.
I address this worry by controlling for a variety of family background vari-
ables. Card’s critique is also likely less valid in the context of this paper
because it seems much less likely that parental characteristics would be cor-
11Finland is divided into 20 administrative regions, which are the regional cultural and
administrative divisions.
12These data are downloaded from the KOTA database maintained by the Ministry of
education: https://kotaplus.csc.fi/ (downloaded 2013-01-08).
12
related with a supply in particular major compared to supply of general
university education.
In addition, there might be differences in upper secondary school quality
between regions. This might affect both the education choice and subsequent
earnings of individuals, which might threaten the validity of the instrument.
This is a small concern in the case of Finland because the secondary educa-
tion is arranged in public schools with a standardised curriculum, very small
differences in resources and quality. Furthermore, since the matriculation
examination is standardized and centrally administered, it is reasonable to
assume that controlling for matriculation examination grades would control
also for differences in the quality of secondary education.
A third possible source of omitted variable bias is that the location of
residence at the time of graduation from upper secondary school might be
correlated with both the choice of university major and labour market con-
ditions after graduating, which, in turn, would create a correlation between
the instrument and the outcome. I address this concern by controlling for the
region of residence at the time of graduation from upper secondary school
in the earnings equation.13 Finally, I assume that yearly changes in starting
places are so small in magnitude that they do not have any general equilib-
rium effects.
The instrument distribution is plotted in 1 in a box-whiskers plot for
each year14. The medians are the smallest for law, and largest for science
and engineering. Further, as evidenced by the interquartile ranges of the
instrument, the variation between regions is largest in business and technol-
ogy, and the smallest in arts. In addition, the box-and-whiskers plots reveal
that for all majors there is both time and cross-sectional variation, which
helps in identification of the model. Further, for the identification of the
choice model, the instruments should also have some independent variation
and not simply act as proxies for living in a university region. To show
13It would also be possible to include region of residence dummies from the year of
observation in the outcome equation. This would increase the precision of the estimates.
However, since the region of residence is determined after the choice of education has been
made, it is potentially endogenous.
14In each of the plots, the strong black lines mark yearly medians for each year; boxes
represent the interquartile range between 25th and 75th quantiles, and whiskers represent
1.5 times the interquartile range. Observations lying outside of the whiskers are marked
as dots.
13
that this is the case, I report the correlation matrix of instruments in Ta-
ble 2. The correlations are considerably smaller than 1 ranging from .085
to .512 which supports the assumption that the instruments truly capture
differences between university regions.
Table 2: Covariance matrix of starting places to applicants in fields.
Ratio in major 1 Ratio in major 2 Ratio in major 3 Ratio in major 4 Ratio in major 5
Ratio in major 1 1 0.422 0.502 0.461 0.512
Ratio in major 2 1 0.466 0.085 0.377
Ratio in major 3 1 0.486 0.298
Ratio in major 4 1 0.450
Ratio in major 5 1
Notes: Ratio is calculated as starting places divided by number of applicants to each major. The major
subjects are 1: arts, education, social science; 2: Law; 3: Business; 4: Engineering and science and 5: Health.
3 Empirical model
In this section, I present the selection correction methodology of Lee (1983)
applied to the context of major choices.
3.1 Selecting into major and income processs
The model features an unordered schooling decision. Conditional on ob-
served and unobserved characteristics, agents make their major choice based
on the comparison of the expected utility associated with each major sub-
ject. This utility includes both monetary and non-monetary benefits as well
as monetary and psychic costs. I assume that the earnings processes of
individuals are determined by the agent’s observed and unobserved char-
acteristics plus a permanent earnings shock and a yearly transitory shock,
both of which may depend on the choice of education made by the agent.
In essence, I allow for observationally similar individuals to have different
realizations for the return to completing a degree. I interpret the variance
of these returns as uncertainty related to the choice of education.
The stylized model consists of two stages. In stage one, each high school
graduate chooses their preferred major subject or, alternatively, enters the
labour market with a high school education. In the second stage, university
graduates enter the labour market and face income streams which are deter-
mined by major specific mean incomes, permanent earnings differences and
transitory shocks. There are N individuals who are observed over T periods
14
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Figure 1: Distribution of the instruments.
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and have to make the their education choice over alternatives Si = 0, 1, ...,M .
The log total income of individual i with education s in year t is given by
ysti = αs + xtiβ + σsesi + ψstεsti, (1)
where αs is a major specific intercept and xit is a vector of observables.xti is
a vector of control variables, which includes year of birth, parental education,
socioeconomic status, mother tongue dummies, and matriculation examina-
tion grades from mathematics, mother tongue, the mean of all examination
grades and a dummy variable which indicates whether the students have
completed a basic or an advanced syllabus in mathematics. In addition, I
include a measure for potential experience and its square. It is calculated as
the difference of the observation year and the year of graduation.
The error term of (1) consists of two uncorrelated standard normal com-
ponents, with [
esi
εsti
]
∼ N
([
0
0
]
,
[
1 0
0 1
])
.
The variances of two independent shocks are scaled by σs and ψst.
esi captures the time-invariant earnings potential for major s. σsesi are
allowed to be correlated with the observable characteristics xit. The term
εsti, on the other hand, captures the transitory income shocks, which are
assumed to be uncorrelated with the other terms in (1).
The potential problem of selection arises because agents’ major choices
and their earnings potential in the major might be correlated with one an-
other. I formalize the selection into education as a multinomial selection
model of Lee (1983). Denote the utility individual i from choice s as
Vsi = zsiγs + ηsi,
where the vector zi = (z1i, . . . , zMi) includes all time-invariant components
of xi, and a major-specific instrument which is assumed to only affect the
choice of major, but not the monetary returns of graduating from a major.
I assume that the error terms ηsi in the utility functions are identically and
independently Gumbel distributed, and independent of zsi. The error terms
ηs capture the private information related to agents’ major choice, such as
motivation, tastes, and the unobserved ability.
Agents choose major s if and only if
Vsi > Vji, ∀ j 6= s,
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which is equivalent to
zsiγs + ηs > zjiγj + ηj , ∀ j 6= s
⇔ max
j
{zjiγj − zsiγs + ηs − ηj} < 0, ∀ j 6= s
⇔ νsi < Φ−1 (PSi) ,
where νsi ∼ N(0, 1), and
PSi = P (Si = s | zi) = exp (zsiγs)∑M
j=1 exp (zjiγj)
. (2)
It is further assumed that the joint distribution of the transformed variable
νsi and esi is bivariate standard normal with a correlation coefficient ρs. Now
the analysis of Heckman (1979) (which relies on the joint normality of error
terms) can be applied to the transformed random variable νsi.
Under these assumptions, the expected earnings of an individual who has
chosen s, read as
E [ysti | Si = s, xti, zti] = E [ysti | zsiγs > νsi, xti, zti]
= αs + xtiβ − σsρsλs(zi), (3)
= αs + xtiβ − µsλs(zs), (4)
where
λs(zi) =
φ
(
Φ−1 (Psi)
)
Psi
,
and µs = σsρs.
Selection also implies that the observed earnings distribution is trun-
cated, and its variance reads as:
V ar [ysti | Si = s, xti, zti] = V ar [σsesi + ψstεsti | zsiγs > νsi, xti, zti]
= σ2s(1− ρ2sδsi) + ψ2st, (5)
where
δsi =
(
Φ−1 (Psi) + λs(zi)
)
λs(zi)
gives the degree of understatement of the observed earnings variance com-
pared to potential earnings variance, which would be observed if the educa-
tion was randomly assigned15.
15The expressions for and δsi and λsi are derived in Bourguignon et al. (2007).
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Equation (3) captures the observed earnings given that agents have cho-
sen s. In particular, it demonstrates, that if µs 6= 0, not correcting for selec-
tion will give biased estimates for the returns to each major.
τst = V ar (σsesi + ψstεsti | η0i, . . . , ηSi, xti, zi) = σ2s
(
1− ρ2s
)
+ ψ2st (6)
is the unforeseeable component of the earnings residual, or earnings uncer-
tainty, which is corrected for selection and truncation.
The uncertainty related for each major in expression(6) consists of two
parts. The first term is the permanent component net of unobserved hetero-
geneity, and the second component is the yearly-varying transitory shock.
Equation (6) also directly implies that whenever ρs 6= 0, observed earnings
inequality is smaller than the potential earnings inequality, which we would
observe if the major subjects were randomly assigned.
Further, it is worth noting, that the difference between expressions (5)
and (6) is that (5) captures the observed variance of earnings conditional on
observables, and (6) captures the potential variance, which we would observe
major subjects were randomly assigned.
3.2 Identification of variance components
Equations (3), and (5) suggest a step-wise approach for identifying the com-
ponents of (6). First, selection equation (2) is estimated by maximum like-
lihood. Thereafter, the terms λˆsi and δˆsi are estimated. In the second step,
a within-individual model
ysti − y¯si = (xti − x¯si)β +
(
ϑsti − ϑ¯si
)
, (7)
where ϑsti = ψstεsti, and y¯si, x¯si and ϑ¯si denote individual means of the
corresponding variables, is estimated. Note that the selection bias terms
λs are time-invariant, so they are incorporated in the fixed effects. Term
ψ2st can be solved from the variance of the residual terms (See Appendix for
derivation).
Parameters αˆs, βˆ, and µˆs can be estimated from the between-individuals
model.
y¯si = αs + x¯β + µsλsi + wi. (8)
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Residual term in (8) equals
wi = σsesi + ϑ¯si − µsλsi,
and by the inclusion of µsλsi its expectation is zero, which also ensures that
the estimate for αs is unbiased.
Variance of wi reads as
V ar [wi | Si = s, x¯ti, zi] = σ2sesi − µ2sδsi +
∑
t ψ
2
st
T
.
Replacing each parameter with their consistent estimate, and solving for σˆs,
gives a consistent estimate for the permanent earnings variance.
σˆ2s =
ˆV ar [wi | Si = s, x¯ti, zi] + µ2s ˆ¯δs − ˆ¯ψ2s .
Each term in (6) is now identified:
τˆ2st = σˆ
2
s − µˆ2s + ψˆ2st.
4 Estimation results
4.1 First stage
The first stage of the model is estimated by a maximum likelihood multino-
mial logit. Each of the models includes the following background variables:
gender, year of birth, parental education, socioeconomic status and mother
tongue dummies. Academic ability of individuals is measured by matricu-
lation examination grades from mathematics, mother tongue, the mean of
all examination grades and a dummy which indicates whether students have
completed a basic or an advanced syllabus in mathematics. In addition, the
selection model includes the instrument, which is the ratio of starting places
to applicants for each of the major choices. I estimate separate selection
models for men and women.
Since the applicants-to-places ratio varies in time and across majors, the
data would also allow me to estimate a more flexible model where the effect of
applicants-to-places ratio would vary across major choices. Because of small
sample sizes in some majors the coefficient on the ratio is indistinguishable
from the model where the coefficient of the ratios are restricted to be identical
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between majors, I have therefore opted to use a simpler model where the
effect of the applicants-to-places ratios are restricted to be the same across
majors.
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 3. Association between
the probability of graduating from arts and the grade in mother tongue are
positively associated with one another at conventional statistical significance
levels. Scoring high in the mathematics exam is associated with the proba-
bility of graduating from medicine and engineering, and the general grade is
statistically significantly positively associated with the probability of grad-
uating from business, arts, and law.
To facilitate the interpretation of the impact of the instrument on selec-
tion, Table 4 reports the marginal effect of the places-to-applicants ratio
on the selection into different majors. The marginal effects are evaluated at
major means. A ten percent increase in the applicants-to-places ratio im-
plies an increase for the probability of graduating from a major between 13
percentage (for engineering) and 2 percentage (for medicine) for men. The
corresponding marginal effects range between 24 percentage (for arts) and
2.7 percentage (for law).
4.2 Return to major estimates
I present the estimates based on the between individuals equation (8) in this
subsection. The results are given in Table 5.
Adding the estimated λs’s as regressors gives unbiased estimates for the
return to education estimates, but the estimated covariance matrix of the
estimates is biased because it disregards the sampling error in the generated
regressors. To correct for the extra sampling variability, I have resorted to
a block bootstrap procedure where 250 samples of size N are drawn with
replacement from the original population. For each bootstrap draw k, the
estimates αˆks ,βˆk and µˆks are calculated. Expected values and standard errors
of the parameters are calculated from the distribution of these bootstrap
draws.
The first column of Table 5 reports the return estimates calculated from
a model without any controls. Second column in Table 5 reports the return
estimates with after controlling for x, and the third column reports the re-
turn estimates controlling for x, and λs. Comparing the return estimates of
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Table 3: Multinomial logit estimates of major choice
Men Women
General grade × Arts 0.322*** 0.178***
(0.065) (0.047)
Mother tongue grade × Arts 0.285*** 0.294***
(0.066) (0.056)
Advanced level exam in math × Arts 0.426* 0.637**
(0.217) (0.228)
Math grade × Arts 0.03 0.217***
(0.043) (0.029)
Advanced level exam in math × math grade × Law -0.34 -0.075
(0.061) (0.071)
General grade × Law 0.962*** 0.563***
(0.191) (0.177)
Mother tongue grade × Law 0.065 0.366***
(0.161) (0.174)
Advanced level exam in math × Law -0.042 1.495**
(0.593) (0.522)
Math grade × Law 0.010 0.292***
(0.089) (0.072)
Advanced level exam in math × math grade × Law -0.182 -0.027
(0.146) (0.140)
General grade × Business 0.449*** 0.369***
(0.096) (0.098)
Mother tongue grade × Business -0.017 0.089
(0.088) (0.099)
Advanced level exam in math × Business 0.312 1.505***
(0.320) (0.364)
Math grade × Business 0.152** 0.508***
(0.062) (0.052)
Advanced level exam in math × math grade × Business 0.022 0.223***
(0.078) (0.097)
General grade × Engineering 0.043 0.003
(0.064) (0.081)
Mother tongue grade × Engineering -0.021 0.112
(0.058) (0.086)
Advanced level exam in math × Engineering 0.279 1.262***
(0.251) (0.315)
Math grade × Engineering 0.145** 0.467***
(0.066) (0.056)
Advanced level exam in math imesmath grade × Engineering 0.632*** 0.641***
(0.053) (0.081)
General grade × Medicine 0.294* -0.021
(0.146) (0.083)
Mother tongue grade × Medicine 0.300** 0.222*
(0.136) (0.092)
Advanced level exam in math × Medicine 0.407 1.067***
(0.576) (0.336)
Math grade × Medicine 0.226. 0.332***
(0.121) (0.058)
Advanced level exam in math ×math grade × Medicine 0.309** 0.469***
(0.115) (0.089)
Ratio 0.609** 1.00***
(0.287) (0.290)
Notes: Omitted category is upper secondary school. Ratio is calculated as starting places divided by number of
applicants to each major. In addition to the variables reported, both models include controls for regression
specifications include controls for year of birth, first language, family socioeconomic status and parental
education dummies. Significance levels in both models: *** 0.1%, ** 1%, * 5% and . 10%.
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Table 4: Marginal effects of the instrument.
Men Women
Arts 0.081** 0.242***
(0.038) (0.070)
Law 0.015** 0.027***
(0.007) (0.008)
Business 0.046** 0.077***
(0.022) (0.022)
Engineering 0.13** 0.118***
(0.061) (0.034)
Medicine 0.021** 0.081***
(0.010) (0.024)
Notes: Marginal effects evaluated at means of each major. Significance levels in both models: *** 0.1%, ** 1%,
* 5% and . 10%.
the first and the second and third column reveals that controlling for family
background, matriculation examination grades and potential experience in-
creases the return estimates considerably. The effect of selection correction
is much smaller.
The Wald test for the joint significance of the correction function terms
can be interpreted as a test for the significance of the unobserved hetero-
geneity over the entire sample. The p-value of 0.15 for suggests that the
impact of unobserved heterogeneity is rather inaccurately estimated in the
male sample. The corresponding value of p=0.08 for women is borderline
significant. Selection correction increases the return estimates for all majors,
but the differences of corrected and uncorrected estimates are not statisti-
cally significant, as evidenced by the Hausman test statistics reported in
Table 5. This is driven by the fact that selection correction inflates the
standard errors of the return estimates.
If the selection correction terms were not statistically significant, both
OLS and the selection corrected models would be unbiased, but OLS is more
efficient. Under the alternative hypothesis, OLS is biased, but the selection
corrected estimates are unbiased. The Wald test statistics reported in Table
5 are insignificant for males, and weakly significant for females.
There are considerable differences in the returns to majors.16 For both
sexes, the largest corrected return estimates are for health (169 log points for
men, and 129 log points for women). The smallest corrected return estimates
are for the arts degree, which are 104 log points for men, and 92 log points
16Differences are significant at p < 0.05 significance level for both sexes and uncorrected
and corrected specifications.
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for men.17 The return estimates are larger and earnings profiles steeper
for males than for females. A potential explanation for this is that fertility
decisions of women in their late 20s and early 30s cause longer breaks in
their careers than they do for men (see, e.g., Lundberg & Rose 2000).
17Though not discussed in detail, I have also experimented with a specification where
the potential experience terms are interacted with the major dummies to allow the in-
come trajectories vary between majors. I find that the interaction terms do not jointly
statistically significantly differ from one another, but the returns to major estimates are
unrealistically large.
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4.3 Uncertainty estimates
This subsection discusses the uncertainty estimates related to each of the
majors. The uncertainty is defined as the ex ante variance of earnings not
captured by the observable characteristics or the correction function. Uncer-
tainty is further decomposed into two orthogonal components: permanent
earnings inequality and transitory shocks. The uncertainty estimates are
presented in Table 6.
I start by discussing the variance of transitory shocks given in the first
row of Tables 6 A and B. Since the transitory shocks are time-varying, I
concentrate first on their time means. Comparing the first column in 6
A and B to the others reveals that completing a university degree decreases
transitory uncertainty considerably. The decrease is almost four-fold for men
and over two-fold for women. The differences between majors are rather
small and do not differ from one another at conventional risk levels. The
yearly transitory shock variances are plotted in Figure 2. Yearly transitory
shocks are particularly large for the year 1993. This is likely explained by
the exceptionally deep recession which took place in Finland in the early
1990’s. Further, the sample sizes for the years in the start of the sample are
very small.
Second rows in Tables 6 A and B report permanent earnings differences.
People with a university education face somewhat larger permanent earnings
differences compared to upper secondary school graduates, but the smaller
transitory shocks of the university graduates compensates for the increase in
permanent earnings differences so, in total, university graduates face smaller
earnings uncertainty than upper secondary school graduates.
Among male university graduates, engineering graduates face 30 % smaller
permanent earnings differences in comparison to other major groups’ average
(p = 0.05). Among female graduates, no statistically significant differences
emerge.
Permanent earnings shocks are further decomposed into two parts: per-
manent earnings uncertainty and unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved het-
erogeneity is reported in row three of Tables 6 A and B. The estimates for
unobserved heterogeneity are inaccurately estimated and small; and nondis-
cernible from zero at conventioal significance levels. Shares of unobserved
heterogeneity in total uncertainty are visualized in Figure 3.
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Transitory effect dominates permanent earnings differences for both gen-
ders and all education groups. This observation may be driven by the fact
that people in the data are in the beginning of their careers. As young peo-
ple are more likely to be engaged in job shopping and are less likely to be
protected by tenure. The finding that younger workers face larger transitory
shocks than older ones is a common finding from several developed coun-
tries. Nonetheless, it is often the case that early career earnings shocks tend
to evolve into permanent earnings differences as people gather more work
experience and are able to secure their employment (see e.g., Baker & Solon,
2003).
Key empirical findings of this section are three. First, completing major
decreases uncertainty regardless of major and gender. Second, no differences
between majors arise, with the exception of males who have graduated from
engineering. Third, the impact unobserved heterogeneity is estimated to be
economically small and statistically insignificant.
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Figure 2: Yearly transitory shock variances by education categories. Ma-
jors are classified as follows: 0: Upper secondary school graduate; 1: Arts,
education, social science; 2: Law; 3: Business; 4: Engineering and science
and 5: Health. The vertical dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals
calculated by bootstrap.
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Figure 3: The solid lines represent the total observed earnings variances for
men (black) and women (gray). The dashed lines represent the estimated
uncertainty. Education category 0 refers to no university education, and
categories 1–5 refer to university majors. The majors are classified as follows:
1: Arts, education, social science; 2: Law; 3: Business; 4: Engineering and
science and 5: Health.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies returns to university majors, and the uncertainty related
to them in the presence of selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity. Us-
ing this model, the residuals of a earnings regression are decomposed into
two types of earnings shocks: permanent earnings differences, and a yearly
transitory earnings shocks; and to an unobserved heterogeneity component,
which is known to the agent, but unobservable to the researcher. In addition
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to wages, measure of income used in this study includes transfers to people
who are not working. This gives a possibility also to include the unemployed
in the estimation allowing for a more complete picture of income uncertainty.
University majors are aggregated into five roughly similar categories.
Local differences in the supply of education measured by the starting places
to applicants ratio are used as instruments for selection into majors. Possible
bias due to self-selection is controlled by applying a multinomial selection
correction model of Lee (1983), and an instrument based on local variation
in the selectivity of different majors.
Substantive results of this paper are summarized in Figure 4. The ef-
fect of completing an academic degree ranges between 104 and 169 for men
and between 92 and 129 log points for women over the earnings of an upper
secondary education. In addition to increasing expected returns, university
education also is found to decrease earnings uncertainty for both sexes. The
differences in the earnings uncertainty are found to be statistically signifi-
cant at 5% risk level, whereas the confidence intervals for the uncertainty
estimates of different majors overlap making them statistically indistinguish-
able from one another.
Selection correction terms do not enter statistically significantly to either
of the models, which implies that the corrected and uncorrected returns
estimates are statistically indistinguishable from one another, and that the
estimate for the unobserved heterogeneity is very close to zero. This is likely
partly due to the small sample sizes in many of the majors, and broad set of
control variables utulised.
Notwithstanding the caveats related to small sample sizes, this paper
contributes another piece of evidence suggesting that (higher) education is
a good investment from the point of view of the individual. In addition to
increasing expected earnings, graduating from a university decreases earnings
uncertainty. This notion holds regardless of the major subject.
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Figure 4: Mean-variance plots. Notes: vertical and horizontal lines represent
95% confidence intervals for estimates.
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Appendix: Estimating ψˆ2st from the residuals of the
within-model
Equation 7:
ysti − y¯si = (xti − x¯i)β +
(
ϑsti − ϑ¯si
)
Assuming that observations are missing at random and that εst and εst−k
are independent for all k 6= 0, the residual variance can be written as
V ar
(
ϑsit − ϑ¯si
)
= Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
ψ2st +
Ωsi
T 2i
,
where Ti is number of observation years of observation i and Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1 ψ
2
st.
Summing both sides up over t gives
Ti∑
t=1
Wst =
(
1− 2
T
)
Ωsi +
Ωsi
T
and solving this for Ωsi gives
Ωsi =
∑Ti
t=1Wst(
1− 1
T
) .
Plugging this back to the expression of V ar
(
ϑsti − ϑ¯si
)
and solving for ψ2st
gives
ψ2st = Wst
Ti
Ti − 2 −
Ωst
Ti (Ti − 2) .
Finally, replacing Ti’s their sample average and Wst with its consistent esti-
mate gives
ψˆ2st = Wˆst
T¯
T¯ − 2 −
Ωˆs
T¯
(
T¯ − 2) ,
where Ωˆs =
∑Ti
t=1 Wˆst(
1− 1
T¯
) .
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